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2Abstract
Developing labor shortages are expected to increase the imponance of applicant attraction
into the next century. Unfonunately, previous research has provided little in the way of unified
theory or operational guidelines for organizations confronted with attraction difficulties. In part,
this is because much research has been framed from the applicant's, rather than the
organization's, perspective. In addition, attraction-related theories and research are scattered
across a variety of literatUres, and often identified primarily with topics other than attraction per
se (e.g., wage, motivation, or discrimination theories).
The present paper draws on multiple literatures to develop a model of applicant attraction
from the organization's perspective. In it, we (1) outline three general strategies for enhancing
applicant attraction, (2) propose broad categories of contingency factors expected to affect the
choice (and potential effectiveness) of alternative strategies, (3) suggest probable
interrelationships among the strategies, (4) link applicant attraction strategies to other human
resource practices, (5) outline various dimensions of attraction outcomes (e.g. qualitative and
quantitative, attitUdinal and behavioral, temporal), and (6) discuss implications for futUre
attraction research.
3Introduction
Organizations have always been concerned about attracting and selecting the "right types"
of employees (e.g., Schneider, 1976 & 1987). However, the relative attention paid to attracting,
versus screening, new employees depends on many factors such as the relative attractiveness of
the vacancy and the general state of the labor market (Guion, 1976; Rynes, in press).
In the latter regard, demographic developments such as the baby bust and the leveling off
of female labor force participation rates suggest that widespread labor shonages will develop and
persist well into the twenty-first century. Along with these trends, demographers predict an
increased emphasis on labor attraction (Johnston, 1987). Indeed, increased concerns about
applicant attraction are already apparent in the popular press (e.g., Bernstein, 1987; Finney,
1989; Hanigan, 1987; Merrill, 1987).
To date, the management and organizational behavior literatures have focused on
recruitment as the dominant tool for attracting applicants (Rynes, Heneman & Schwab, 1980;
Schwab, 1982; Wanous, 1980). However, prior economic research into the functioning of labor
markets suggests that improved recruitment is frequently an inadequate response to attraction
difficulties, particularly when vacancies are unattractive, or labor shonages persistent (e.g., Kerr
& Fisher, 1950; MaIm, 1955; Doeringer & Piore, 1971). In such situations, more aggressive
strategies generally become necessary.
In light of these considerations, the present paper draws from multiple literatures
(economics, human resource management, industrial psychology, organizational behavior, and
sociology) to develop an interdisciplinary model of applicant attraction. Moreover, unlike most
psychological treatments of applicant attraction (e.g, Rynes, et aI., 1980; Wanous, 1977), the
present model is developed from the organization's rather than the applicant's perspective.
Anticipated benefits of adopting an interdisciplinary, organizational perspective include the
following: (1) discussion of a broader range of strategies for attracting applicants; (2) delineation
4of contingency factors affecting strategic choices, (3) consideration of potential interrelationships
among alternative strategies; (4) increased awareness of potential differences in organizational
responses to diverse environmental conditions; (5) a series of testable propositions regarding the
conditions under which various strategies or combinations of strategies will be employed, (6)
greater awareness of the interrelationships between attraction strategies and other human resource
practices, (7) consideration of a broader range of attraction-related outcomes, and (8) suggestions
for making future attraction research more relevant to organizational decision makers.
Domain and Boundaries
At the outset, it is helpful to delineate the boundaries of the present discussion. First, the
model focuses primarily on applicant attraction, as distinct from screening or selection.
Although attraction and selection are inherently intenwined in the process of filling vacancies
(e.g., Boudreau & Rynes, 1985; Schwab, 1982), we focus here on activities designed to increase
the number, or change the characteristics of, individuals willing to consider joining an
organization.
Second, the model makes a distinction between "attraction" and "recruitment". Although
recruitment theories often treat recruitment as largely synonymous with attraction (e.g., Rynes, et
al., 1980; Schwab, 1982), the present paper views recruitment as a means of accomplishing
applicant attraction. Thus, improved recruitment is regarded as one potential strategy for
enhancing attraction, but so are decisions to modify employment inducements or to target
different kinds of applicants.
Third, the model is concerned primarily with strategic choices in novel or changed
situations (e.g., precipitous decline in labor supply; new job creation). Under normal conditions.
organizational decision makers follow largely automatic scripts involving little conscious decision
making or "strategic" choice (e.g., Klein, 1989; Osterman, 1987). However, when conventional
scripts fail to produce desired results, decision makers begin to consciously seek new, more
5effective strategies. We attempt here to delineate the factors affecting the choice, and likely
effectiveness, of various strategic options.
The Model
The present model outlines three conceptually distinct (albeit often interrelated) strategies
for attracting applicants: (1) altering recruitment practices, (2) targeting nontraditional applicants,
and (3) modifying employment inducements (Figure 1). Although psychological research has
primarily emphasized recruitment strategies, economic and sociological field research has
demonstrated that inducement and applicant targeting strategies also play an integral role in
attempts to attract more, better, or more cost-effective applicants.
Insen Figure 1 about here
As shown in Figure 1, a number of contingencies are hypothesized to influence the relative
mix of the three strategies. These include labor market conditions (e.g., expected duration of
labor shonages), vacancy characteristics (e.g., relative attractiveness), organizational constraints
(e.g., ability to pay), and phase of the attraction process (e.g., job application versus job
acceptance) .
Additionally the model suggests that when conscious decision processes come into play,
alternative strategies are generally considered interactively rather than independently (e.g., see
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Doeringer & Piore, 1971). Thus, for example, decisions about applicant pools and recruitment
messages are based at least in part on decisions about employment inducements.
The model also suggests several ways in which attraction strategies interact with other
human resource (HR) management practices. More specifically, attraction strategies both affect,
and are affected by, current HR practices. For example, the adoption of new inducement
strategies is frequently constrained by current compensation practices. Conversely, decisions to
target new applicant pools often necessitate changes in selection methods (Doeringer & Piore,
61971; Ostennan, 1987), as well as post-hire practices (e.g., socialization and training; see Fisher,
1986; Sutton & Louis, 1987).
The model also emphasizes the multidimensionality of attraction outcomes. For example,
outcomes have both quantitative (e.g., number of applicants, job acceptance rates) and qualitative
dimensions (e.g., acquired skills, aptitudes, direct costs and cost-effectiveness of acceptees).
Additionally, there are multiple phases to the attraction process, each with its own unique
outcomes. For example, an organization may get many applications but few acceptances, or
insufficient applications but high acceptance rates. Finally, attraction processes generate both
attitudinal (e.g., perceived organizational image) and behavioral (e.g., job rejection) outcomes.
Finally, the model incorporates previous theory and research suggesting that attraction
strategies influence post-hire outcomes. For example, psychologically-oriented research has
linked variations in recruitment sources or realistic previews to newcomer satisfaction and length
of service (e.g., Breaugh, 1981; Wanous, 1980). The present paper extends this discussion to
other attraction practices (e.g., inducements) and outcomes (e.g., "insider" attitudes and
behaviors) as well.
General Attraction Strategies
Under any given set of market conditions, at least three conceptually distinct strategies exist
for increasing success in attracting labor. These are: (1) improving recruitment practices, (2)
altering employment inducements, and (3) targeting nontraditional applicants. Each is discussed
in tum.
Recruitment Practices
Of the proposed attraction strategies, recruitment practices have received the most attention
in the management and organizational behavior literatures. The present paper briefly
summarizes four dimensions of recruitment that have been hypothesized to influence applicant
attraction.
7Organizational Representatives. Several characteristics of organizational representatives
(e.g., recruiters, hiring managers) have been hypothesized to affect applicants' impressions and
decisions about organizations. If in fact organizational representatives have important effects on
applicants, it would make sense to ensure that recruiting representatives possess the "right"
characteristics through selection, training, or some combination of the two (Rynes & Boudreau,
1986).
To date, research on organizational representatives has concentrated almost exclusively on
campus recruiters. A review of this research suggests that: (1) recruiter characteristics explain
more variance in attitudes that are far removed from job choice (e.g., impressions of recruiters
~
se) than those closer to choice (e.g., likelihood of accepting a job offer); (2) recruiter
characteristics generally explain less variance in studies that control for job characteristics than
those that do not, and (3) virtually no evidence exists that actual job choices are affected by
recruiters, once job characteristics are taken into account (Rynes, in press).
Thus, the employer wishing to attract more or better applicants will not find much support
for the notion that improving the performance of organizational representatives will enhance job
acceptance rates (although it may enhance the more general "public relations" aspects of
attraction). It should be noted, however, that prior research has not directly tested the potential
benefits of recruiter selection and training programs. Rather, recruiters have been studied as
"naturally occurring phenomena" in campus placement offices. Second, it should be noted that
other (unstudied) representatives such as hiring managers or potentia] coworkers may exen
greater influence on applicants than do campus recruiters (e.g., Fisher, lIgen & Hoyer, 1979).
Recruitment Messages. A second recruitment dimension that may affect attraction is the
nature of the "message" transmitted to prospective employees. Although vacancies are
ostensibly composed of a "given" set of attributes, discretion is nevertheless possible in terms of
the content, favorability, and detail with which vacancies are described. Room for discretion
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arises from such factors as imperfect job seeker information, inherent subjectivity in describing
and evaluating certain attributes (e.g., career prospects), and the flexibility built into many job
descriptions (Schwab, et al., 1987).
To date, the vast majority of research has focused on message favorability (usually called
"realism"), rather than on message content or level of detail. Interest in message favorability
arose from concerns that employers take advantage of job seeker uncenainty to "oversell"
vacancies (e.g., Schneider, 1976), perhaps at the expense of subsequent employee satisfaction
and turnover.
Empirical evidence is mixed as to whether or not realistic messages reduce job acceptance
rates. For example, a meta-analysis of ten studies showed no effect whatsoever (d=.OO) until a
large outlier containing more than 1/4 of the total sample was eliminated from the analysis
(Premack & Wanous, 1986). Additionally, considerable work remains to identify the
psychological processes involved, the generaJizability of effects across a wide variety of jobs
and applicants, and the productivity-related characteristics of acceptors versus rejectors under
more (less) favorable messages (Rynes, in press).
Beyond favorability, however, other potentially imponant message dimensions remain
almost completely unstudied. These include (1) the effects of emphasizing cenain kinds of
content over others (e.g., extrinsic versus intrinsic, verifiable versus nonverifiable); (2) the
effects of revealing various kinds of information (e.g., pay) at early versus late stages of the
process; (3) the most effective ways to present credible information about non verifiable
attributes; (4) the extent to which strategies for designing effective recruitment messages
generalize across "good" and "bad" jobs!, and (5) whether different kinds of information (e.g.,
verifiable and nonverifiable) are equally effectively communicated across different media.
Recruitment Sources. Success in attracting desirable employees may also depend upon the
source(s) through which applicants are located. Presumably, sources differ in the extent to
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which they provide detailed and accurate infonnation (both to applicants and employers), as well
as in the productivity-related characteristics of the applicants reached (e.g., Ullman, 1966;
Schwab, 1982).
To date, research on recruitment sources has focused exclusively on (1) selectees rather
than job applicants and (2) post-hire rather than pre-hire outcomes (e.g., Breaugh, 1981; Taylor
& Schmidt, 1983). Unfonunately, selection, self-selection, and post-hire effects are all
inherently confounded in such research (Rynes, in press). As such, extant research has little to
say about source effects on applicants' pre-hire attitudes, productivity-related characteristics, and
decisions.
Recruitment Timing. Two hypotheses have been offered as to how recruitment timing
might be modified to an employer's advantage. The first suggests that by avoiding delays
between recruitment stages, employers can minimize the chances of discouraging applicants and
causing them to accept other offers (Rynes, et al., 1980). To date, this hypothesis has received
little empirical attention, and only mixed suppon (see, e.g., Arvey, Gordon, Massengill &
Mussio, 1975 versus Taylor & Bergmann, 1987).
The second hypothesis suggests that employers who extend the first offer to a candidate
may have an advantage over those who extend subsequent offers. According to Soelberg
(1967), the costs, anxieties and uncenainties of job search cause many applicants to favor "sure"
offers over uncenain ones, provided they do not contain any minimally unacceptable features
(e.g., insufficient salary). If true, employers who practice early recruitment may have a
competitive advantage in attracting applicants. However, this strategy may only work for
employers of above-average competitiveness, as the "best" applicants (see footnote 1) may not
jump at early offers unless those who offer them are also highly desirable employers (e.g.,
Weiss, 1980; Yellen, 1984).
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In sum, despite the fact that the timing of recruitment activities has been hypothesized to
affect both the quantity and quality of applicants attracted, no firm conclusions can be drawn
about timing effects.
Employment Inducements
A second strategy for enhancing applicant attraction is to improve the nature of the
inducements offered. For example, employers who are confronted with attraction difficulties can
raise salaries, improve benefits, implement flextime, provide child or eldercare, develop internal
career paths, or make any number of other improvements in working conditions. Although
previous studies have typically used the term "job attributes," we use the term "inducements" to
convey the notion of deliberately modifying attributes for the explicit purpose of enhancing job
attractiveness.
Most research on employment inducements has been of limited usefulness to organizations.
For example, the vast number of attribute rating or ranking studies share a number of serious
flaws that threaten both their internal and external validity (e.g., Lawler, 1971; Rynes, Schwab
& Heneman, 1983). Policy capturing experiments address some of these difficulties (e.g., they
reduce social desirability tendencies and provide a concrete decision context), but introduce
limitations of their own. For example, policy capturing experiments involve hypothetical rather
than real job choices, cannot be generalized beyond the inducements and inducement levels
presented, and presume market characteristics that are not realistic for most job seekers (e.g.,
perfect information, multiple simultaneously available alternatives; Schwab et al., 1987).
Nevertheless, previous research does suggest that job attributes are far and away the major
determinants of applicant reactions. For example, in the few psychological studies that have
simultaneously examined recruiters and job attributes, both laboratory experiments and field
surveys suggest that attributes dominate applicants' attitudes, particularly at later stages of the
attraction process. In fact, recruiter effects have typically faded to nonsignificance once job
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attributes are taken into account (e.g., Powell, 1984; Rynes & Miller, 1983; Taylor &
Bergmann, 1987; for an exception see Harris & Fink, 1987).
Moreover, a limited number of field experiments suggest that inducements affect behaviors
as well as attitudes, and applicant quality as well as quantity. For example, experimental
inducement programs in the Armed Services have shown that both the quantity and quality (as
measured by aptitude test scores) of Army recruits are highly sensitive to changes in extrinsic
inducements such as salaries, recruitment and retention bonuses, and educational incentives (e.g.,
Lakhani, 1988; Tannen, 1987). Similar results were obtained in a cross-sectional examination of
Navy enlistment rates by region, where enlistments were modeled as a function of alternative
employment opportunities, regional office expenditures on recruitment, and Naval salaries
relative to local wage levels (Hanssens & Levien, 1983).
Unfortunately, a variety of difficulties prohibit finn conclusions as to precisely which
inducements are most strongly related to applicant attraction. For example, different
methodologies appear to produce different attribute preference hierarchies (Schwab, et aL 1987).
In addition, the relative importance of various inducements appears to be subject to both
individual differences and differences in market characteristics (Lawler, 1970; Reynolds, 1951).
Still, theoretical arguments (e.g., Rottenberg, 1956; Schwab, et at, 1987) and limited empirical
research (e.g., Lakhani, 1988; Rynes, et aI., 1983; Tannen, 1987) suggest that verifiable
attributes with calculable pecuniary value are likely to be particularly effective attractors.
Applicant Pools
A third way to increase the ability to attract labor is to direct recruitment efforts toward
individuals who are, for one reason or another, less marketable than "traditional" applicants or
the applicants sought by competitors (e.g., Finney, 1989). Generally speaking, organizations
are assumed to target initial recruitment activities toward the most desirable individuals they
think they can attract (e.g., Ken- & Fisher, 1950; MaIm, 1955; Doeringer & Piore, 1971).
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However, if such effons fail, they are then hypothesized to relax their standards until all
vacancies are filled (Thurow, 1975).
Considerable empirical evidence suppons these assumptions. For example, during World
War II, employers sought women and handicapped applicants for jobs formerly filled only by
able-bodied males (Kerr & Fisher, 1950). More recently, employers turned to untrained clerical
and administrative employees to fill entry-level programming jobs when programmers became
scarce and expensive (Osterman, 1987).
Although targeting nontraditional applicants might, at first glance, be assumed to lead to
lower subsequent productivity and overall utility, it should be noted that some employer
preferences (and, hence, factOrs determining applicant "marketability") have not been definitively
shown to be productivity-related (e.g., Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Thurow, 1975). For example,
low marketability may be the result of various forms of discrimination (e.g., occupational
crowding or statistical discrimination) rather than true productivity-related differences (Arrow,
1972; Spence, 1973).
Thus, it is not clear that all marketability-related characteristics (e.g., age, sex, prior
experience) are associated with true differences in productivity, length of service, and other
determinants of overall utility. Indeed, it is possible that pursuit of nontraditional applicants wil1
sometimes lead to greater utility, because such individuals may be equally productive, but work
for lower wages than conventional applicants (Doeringer & Piore, 1971). In any event, because
pursuit of nontraditional applicants appears to be a common adaptation to attraction difficulties,
additional research is warranted in this area.
Contingencies Affecting Choice of Strategy
The three attraction strategies discussed in the preceding section are not perfect substitutes.
They vary both in potential effectiveness (i.e., quality and quantity of applicants attracted) and
potential costs (i.e., direct dollar outlays and threats to organizational productivity).
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Changes in recruitment practices, for example, are relatively low-cost strategies that are
likely to have few consequences beyond the attitudes and behaviors of the employees attracted.
However, their impact on attraction may also be limited, particularly in tight labor markets
(Doeringer & Piore, 1971). In contrast, changes in applicant pools and inducements are more
extreme in the sense that they entail higher costs and/or greater risks (Wanous & Colella, in
press). However, these strategies are also likely to yield greater changes in attraction outcomes
(Rynes, in press).
The three strategies, then, are not perlectly interchangeable. Given a perceived need to
enhance attraction, which strategy will an organization choose? To some extent, the choice will
depend on the organization's unique situation and idiosyncratic practices. Nevertheless, some
general contingencies affecting these choices can be proposed. Four such factors, intended to be
illustrative rather than all-inclusive, are discussed below.
Labor Market Conditions
The supply of available workers, relative to demand, determines the severity of an
organization's attraction problem. As the magnitude, duration, or anticipated duration of
shonages increase, organizations become increasingly willing to employ more costly attraction
strategies. For example, evidence suggests that when shonages fIrst develop, organizations
typically respond by altering recruitment (Doeringer & Piore, 1971). However, they move on to
pool and inducement strategies as shonages deepen or persist (Kerr & Fisher, 1950; MaIm,
1955; Osterman, 1987). Thus:
PI: All else equal, in the initial stages of a labor shortage, recruitment
strategies will be preferred over inducement or applicant pool strategies.
P2: The larger the imbalance between supply and demand, the greater the
likelihood that inducement or nontraditional applicant strategies will be
employed.
P3: The longer the expected duration of a labor shortage, the greater the
tendency to use inducement or pool strategies.
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Vacancy Characteristics
Several vacancy characteristics are also likely to impact on choice of strategy. For
example, vacancies at higher levels are believed to entail both greater potential value, and risk,
to an organization. As such, changes in applicant pools are likely to be resisted due to the
greater uncenainty involved in hiring individuals with unknown productivity characteristics. In
contrast, inducement strategies may be considered more attractive because of the greater
potential payoffs to attracting high-quality applicants. Thus:
P4: Nontraditional applicant pool strategies are less likely to be employed at
higher position levels.
P5: The use of inducement strategies increases at higher position levels.
Attraction strategies may also depend on the degree to which vacancies are embedded in a
career progression. Because strongly embedded positions are more visible to other employees,
changes in inducements and/or applicant characteristics would be expected to have greater cost
and productivity spillover to other positions (Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Granovetter, 1986;
Lewin, 1987). As such, embeddedness would be expected to favor conservative attraction
strategies. Hence:
P6: Inducement and applicant pool strategies are less likely to be employed
for jobs that are strongly embedded in an internal career progression.
The number of incumbents in a position may also affect attraction strategies. For example,
inducement strategies are less expensive when they do not have to be applied to a large number
of peers. Applicant pool strategies may also be more feasible, in that it is less likely that a job
with few incumbents will be strongly sex-, race-, or otherwise stereotyped (Kanter, 1977).
Therefore, we predict:
P7: Organizations will be more likely to use inducement strategies when the
number of present incumbents is small.
P8: Large numbers of incumbents will decrease the propensitJ' to seek
nontraditional applicants.
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Finally, the attractiveness of a vacancy is also likely to have an effect on strategic choices.
For example, when vacancies are highly attractive relative to competitors, one would predict less
need to employ extreme attraction strategies. Additionally, the content of recruitment messages
may also change with differences in vacancy attractiveness. For example, although most
employers appear to avoid realistic recruitment due to anticipated negative effects on attraction
(Schneider, 1976; Stoops, 1984), this tendency is likely to be considerably abated when one's
vacancies are more attractive than competitors'. Thus:
P9: The higher a vacanC)"s attractiveness relative to competitors, the less
will be the need to turn to inducement or nontraditional applicant strategies.
PIO: As vacancies increase in attractiveness, recruitment messages are likely
to become increasingly realistic.
Organizational Constraints
A variety of organizational constraints also impinge on attraction strategies. We focus here
on three factors: rigidity of skill requirements; ability to pay, and strength of internal labor
market norms.
Organizations with very specific skill requirements may be limited to hiring from certain
applicant pools, particularly if the needed skills cannot be acquired internally in a reasonable
period of time and jobs cannot be redesigned to reduce skill requirements. In such situations,
changing applicant pools is not a viable option. On the other hand, inducement strategies may
be more readily employed with rigid skill requirements, particularly when the skill shortage is
general to other organizations as well. Thus:
PH: Organizations are less likely to employ applicant pool strategies when
skill requirements are inflexible.
P12: With rigid skill requirements, recruitment strategies are more likely to
be employed than inducement strategies when skill shortages are specific to
the organization. However, as skill shortages become more general,
inducement strategies are increasingly likely to be employed (largely due to a
lack of other alternatives).
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A second constraint is the organization's ability to pay for changes in inducements. Such
changes may entail substantial direct costs, panicularly if there are many vacancies and/or
enhanced inducements cannot be restricted to new hires. Thus, inducement strategies are less
likely to be employed by organizations with low ability to pay. On the other hand,
nontraditional applicant pools may be explicitly sought for their lower presumed costs (e.g.,
Lewin, 1987; Osterman, 1987). Thus:
P13: Organizations with low ability to pay are less likely to use inducement
strategies, but may be more inclined to consider nontraditional applicant
pools.
Finally, the nature of an organization's culture and values may also influence the choice of
attraction strategies. For example, to the extent that the culture emphasizes internal pay equity
and "lifetime" careers, one would expect to find more limited use of extreme attraction strategies
(e.g., changing applicant characteristics or enhancing inducements to "outsiders"). Thus:
P14: Organizations with internally oriented cultures and values will be less
inclined to use either inducement or nontraditional pool strategies.
Phase of the Attraction Process
In order to fill vacancies, organizations must first "attract" individuals to submit an
application, to undergo various screening procedures, and to accept job offers. A shonage of
willing or qualified applicants at anyone of these stages creates a need to modify attraction
strategies. The appropriate modification may be a function of the stage where the shonage
occurs.
For example, recruitment activities may be effective in encouraging initial applications.
However, evidence suggests that recruitment practices become less imponant as candidates move
closer to making a job choice (Rynes, in press; Taylor & Bergmann, 1987). Therefore,
shonages occurring later in the process (e.g., low job acceptance ratios) may be ineffectually
addressed by recruitment strategies. Thus:
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PIS: Attraction difficulties at early stages are most likely to be adequately
dealt with through recruitment; difficulties at later stages are likely to
require more extreme strategies.
Interrelationships among Alternative Strategies
Although various contingencies may lead organizations to focus primarily on one strategy,
we do not propose that organizations are restricted to using a single approach. In fact,
interdependencies between the alternatives make reliance on a single strategy unlikely. A
complete discussion of all possible interdependencies is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, in the following section we discuss selected situations where decisions and outcomes
involving one attraction strategy would appear to be integrally related to choices concerning
other strategies.
Applicant Pools and Inducements
Efficiency wage and segmented market theories suggest that both the quantity and quality
of availabe workers are functions of the level of inducements offered (e.g., Thurow, 1975;
Weiss, 1980; Yellen, 1984). Simply put, "better" applicants are expected to be attracted to, and
to remain in, "better" vacancies. Thus, all else equal, organizations that seek highly marketable
applicants must either enhance inducements or accept lower levels of attraction success (e.g.,
insufficient job acceptances or acceptances from individuals at the bottom of the pool).
Therefore, we propose that:
P 16: Applicant pool choices are determined, at least in part, by the level of
inducements offered. Conversely, choice of particular pools may dictate
changes in inducements.
Decisions about applicant pools also appear to interact with the type of inducements
offered. For example, employer-subsidized childcare has been used to attract parents of young
children, educational benefits to attract college-oriented youth, and part-time or flexible schedules
to attract students, parents, and retirees (e.g., Merrill, 1987; Tannen, 1987). Thus, organizations
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wishing to target a specific applicant pool may find tailoring inducements to that pool a cost-
effective strategy:
P 17: Inducement strategies, particularly those involving optional benefits or
flexible scheduling, may be designed to complement applicant pool
characteristics. Conversely, applicant pool choices are at least partially
constrained by the ability to modify particular inducements.
Applicant Pools and Recruitment
Decisions to seek nontraditional applicants may bring about changes in recruitment practices
as well. Recruitment sources, representatives, and messages seem panicularly likely to be
affected.
Because different kinds of applicants use different sources (Schwab, 1982; Taylor &
Schmidt, 1983), applicant pool and recruitment source decisions are closely intenwined.
However, sources are chosen for a variety of reasons other than targeting a panicular pool (e.g.,
cost, prescreening services), and a given pool can almost always be accessed via multiple
sources. Thus, although a decision to target nontraditional applicants does not completely
dictate the choice of source(s), there would appear to be considerable interdependencies between
these two decisions. For example, we hypothesize that:
PI8: Decisions to target nontraditional applicants will be accompanied by
shifts in recruitment sources. In particular, walk-ins and employee referrals
are likely to be used less often, as these sources are most likely to produce
applicants similar to current employees.
The choice of organizational representatives may also be affected by decisions to target
nontraditional applicants. Although previous research suggests that representatives do nOt have
much effect on actual job choices, there is limited evidence that applicants prefer representatives
that are largely similar to themselves, although somewhat higher in status (Rynes, in press).
Also, although the issue has not received prior research anention, it is possible that perceived
similarity is more imponant for attracting "nontraditional" than conventional applicants. Thus,
we speculate that:
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P19: Decisions to target nontraditional applicants are frequently
accompanied by shifts to "nontraditional" organizational representatives (e.g.,
recruiters, employees featured in recruiting brochures) as well.
Finally, decisions to pursue nontraditional applicants may also lead to modifications of
recruitment messages. For example, focusing on characteristics that are highly salient to
applicants will probably have a greater impact (either positive or negative) on attraction than
emphasizing less imponant factors.
Although we have only limited information about the salience of various job characteristics
to different kinds of applicants, there is some evidence that relative imponance is associated
with both individual (e.g., age, sex, education) and occupational differences (e.g., Goldthorpe,
Lockwood, Bechhofer, & Platt, 1969; Jurgensen, 1978; Rynes et aI., 1983). To the extent that
such differences can be reliably determined, message content can be effectively tailored to any
given applicant pool (e.g., Krett & Stright, 1985). Thus, we expect that:
P20: Recruitment messages reflect the perceived salience of various
attributes to the desired applicant pool.
Inducements and Recruitment
Both economic and psychological research suggest that applicants typically have little
information about the specific characteristics of vacancies and organizations (e.g., Schwab, et aI.,
1987). Consequently, organizations that modify inducements cannot assume that potential
applicants will automatically be aware of those changes. Thus:
P21: Changes in inducements will affect attraction only to the extent that
such changes are communicated effectively through the recruitment process.
For example, the success of recent Armed Services recruitment and reenlistment programs
(Lakhani, 1988; Tannen, 1987) may be due in pan to the extensive national advenising
campaigns that accompanied their introduction. Moreover, the inducements offered in both these
cases were tangible and easy to verify. Where inducements are intangible (e.g., responsibility.
challenge), credibility becomes an issue and effective communication is more difficult. Hence:
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P 22: Strategies to enhance nonverifiable inducements are more dependent
on effective recruitment practices than are strategies involving verifiable
inducements.
To this point, we have focused on the strategic choices available to organizations faced
with attraction difficulties. In subsequent sections, we discuss various consequences of those
choices.
Attraction Outcomes
In this section, we focus only on attraction outcomes ~ se; that is, outcomes that occur
up to the point of job acceptance or rejection (Figure 1). Potential post-hire consequences are
discussed in subsequent sections.
Ouantitative versus Oualitative Outcomes
Relatively little is known about the number of applicants attracted by different strategies.
This is due primarily to the tendency of previous researchers to use the applicant, rather than
the organization, as the unit of analysis. However, there are both conceptual (e.g., Thurow,
1975) and empirical (e.g., Rynes & Boudreau, 1986) reasons to believe that most vacancies are
eventually filled with someone. If so, the most interesting questions involve not the numbers,
but the characteristics, of those attracted.
Unfortunately, even less is known about the quality of those attracted via various strategies
than the quantity. For example, realistic preview researchers have focused on job acceptance
rates while ignoring the qualifications of those who accept versus reject job offers. As such, it
is possible that the most marketable applicants are the ones "scared off' by realistic previews,
particularly when vacancies are relatively unattractive.
Admittedly, assessing applicant quality is more difficult than recording simple headcounts.
Although some productivity-related characteristics are directly observable (e.g., possession of
particular skills), others can only be inferred via imperfect signals (e.g., grade point averages,
test scores, schoo] quality; Spence, 1973; Thurow, 1975). Still, three types of qualitative
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comparisons would appear to be particularly desirable in future research --comparisons (a) with
those who apply to or accept offers from close competitors, (b) between individuals from
particular sources (e.g., top-tier schools) who do, or do not, accept one's interviews or job
offers, and (c) between characteristics of acquired employees and a priori selection standards or
targets.
Attitudinal versus Behavioral Outcomes
Attraction also has both attitudinal and behavioral consequences. However, attitudinal
outcomes have been better represented than behavioral ones, panicularly in the organizational
behavior and psychology literatures. For example, the vast majority of recruitment research has
focused on applicant attitudes tOward recruiters, jobs, and probable willingness to accept offers
(e.g., Harris & Fink, 1987). Only a few studies, primarily in economics, have focused on
application and acceptance behaviors (e.g., Hanssens & Levien, 1983; Lakhani, 1988).
Although attitudes may be imponant for public relations purposes, behaviors (e.g., actual
applications and acceptances) are more critical for filling vacancies. It has been argued that
intention to engage in a behavior is closely related to the actual behavior (e.g.. Fishbein &
Ajzen, 1975). However, evidence on this issue, particularly with regard to attraction attitudes
and behaviors, is scarce. After all, applicants may express a high degree of willingness to
accept six or seven offers, but can accept only one. Similarly, applicants can "like" eight or
nine recruiters, but choose a tenth offer with a disliked recruiter. Because nearly all research
has been conducted between- rather than within-applicants, any presumed relationship between
attitudes and behaviors is tenuous at best.
Temporal Dimensions
Prior research has been decidedly uneven with respect to outcomes at various stages of the
attraction process. Generally speaking, outcomes from initial interviews have received far more
attention than either prior or subsequent outcomes (see also Taylor & Bergmann, 1987). For
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example, outcomes at the job application stage have been dramatically understudied (Kilduff,
1988) despite their crucial imponance to an organization's ability to generate job acceptances.
As such, we know very little about the factors that cause job seekers to apply for some
vacancies, but not others (e.g., social contactS and influences, perceived organizational image;
e.g., Granovetter, 1974; Kilduff, 1988; Kolenko & Taylor, 1984). Similarly, we know relatively
little about the factors that cause applicants to choose one alternative above all others, or to
reject an offer in hand despite an absence of alternative offers (Schwab, et al., 1987).
Attraction and Other Human Resource Practices
Attraction strategies are related to other HR practices in at least three ways (Figure 1).
First, as discussed in previous sections, the viability of panicular attraction strategies is partially
determined by current HR practices. For example, changes in monetary inducements may be
less feasible in organizations where compensation practices place a strong emphasis on internal
equity (Doeringer & Piore, 1971).
Second, changes in attraction strategies often cannot be successfully operationalized without
simultaneous changes in other HR practices. For example, shifts to nontraditional applicant
pools may be resisted unless accompanied by more rigorous selection practices to counteract the
increased uncenainty of hiring "unknown entities" (e.g., Doeringer & Piore, 1971).
Nontraditional pool strategies may also require changes in job design. For example, law finns
faced with dwindling supplies of top-tier law graduates accompanied the shift to second-tier
applicants with the creation of less challenging entry-level positions that were segmented from
the partnership career path (Lewin, 1987). Conversely, job enlargement has sometimes been
used to attract a higher qualified, more flexible workforce (e.g., Lawler, 1986).
Third, attraction practices (and their resultant outcomes) are also likely to affect post-hire
HR practices. For example, nontraditional applicant pools may be easier or less expensive to
attract, but may require additional socialization and training investments (e.g., Kanter, 1977).
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Alternatively, enhanced inducement strategies are likely to ease most management tasks (e.g.,
orientation, training, performance management), both by attracting higher-quality applicants and
by motivating incumbents to exen greater effon (as job loss becomes more costly; e.g., Weiss,
1980; Yellen, 1984).
The preceding examples represent a panial list of the ways in which attraction strategies
and oUtcomes have been hypothesized to interact with other HR practices. The following
section discusses how they are believed to influence post-hire organizational outcomes as well.
Applicant Attraction and Post-Hire Consequences
To date, relationships between attraction strategies and post-hire outcomes have been
addressed primarily in the recruitment literature, panicularly the recruitment source and RJP
literatures. The latter in panicular has called attention to pOtentially negative relationships
between attraction strategies (e.g., overselling vacancies) and post-hire outcomes (e.g., employee
satisfaction and retention; Premack & Wanous, 1985). However, many other potentially
imponant relationships, both positive and negative, have been largely ignored. Selected
examples are offered below.
A whole array of interesting post-hire issues is raised by the prospect of targeting
nontraditional applicant pools. For example, attraction of nontraditional applicants may increase
long-tenn organizational adapability and performance (Schneider, 1987). On the other hand,
recruiting new types is frequently resisted by organizational insiders and can result in negative
as well as positive outcomes, panicularly in the shoner tenn (e.g., Granovetter, 1986; Sutton &
Louis, 1987). For example, Granovetter (1986) argues that the hiring of nontraditional
applicants (e.g., blacks instead of whites, fresh college graduates instead of "insiders") may
result in the refusal of current employees to engage in the kinds of socialization and training
behaviors necessary for new employees to be successful performers. Additionally, the hiring
of nontraditional employees can result in reduced solidarity among workers, the emergence of
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separate "enclaves" of demographically distinct workers, and the re-drawing of conventional
career lines and internal labor market patterns (e.g., Edwards, Gordon & Reich, 1975; Kanter,
1977). Finally, recruiting nontraditional applicants can cause current employees to see their own
jobs in a different light, as nontraditional applicants bring new information about comparative
conditions in other organizations or industries (Sutton & Louis, 1987).
Employment inducements are also believed to affect post-hire outcomes, particularly
retention and performance. For example, inducements that enhance attraction would also be
expected to increase retention (e.g., Lakhani, 1988; Tannen, 1987). Also, as mentioned
previously, presumed positive relationships between inducement levels, employee quality, and
motivation would be expected to result in higher productivity in high-inducement organizations.
Relationships between recruitment timing and post-hire outcomes also merit future attention.
For example, it has been hypothesized that early pursuit of applicants may result in larger and
better qualified applicant pools, as well as higher job acceptance rates (e.g., Schwab, et aI.,
1987). To date, however, these hypotheses have not been examined. Similarly, the effects of
organizationally-imposed deadlines to accept early offers have also escaped scrutiny. However.
prior discussions of the dissonance resolution processes surrounding job acceptance suggest that
the timing of recruitment contacts, offers, and offer deadlines may have a nontrivial impact on
new employee adjustment (e.g., Janis & Mann, 1977; Soelberg, 1967).
Implications for Future Research
The present perspective on applicant attraction holds a number of important implications for
future research. These are summarized in terms of suggestions for organization-oriented
research, applicant-oriented research, and applicant/organization interactions.
Organization-Oriented Research. One way in which attraction research could be made more
relevant to organizations is to conduct more research from the organization's perspective. Three
25
general kinds of research -- field experiments, field surveys, and basic descriptive research n
would appear to be particularly useful in this regard.
Field experiments have already been used to study RJPs and, at least in the Armed
Services, the effects of changes in employment inducements. However, field experiments could
additionally be designed to analyze the effects of changes in recruiter selection or training
practices, recruitment timing or sources, or targeted applicant pools. In each case, attempts
should be made to assess as many relevant outcomes as possible (e.g., pre- and post-hire,
quantitative and qualitative, multiple stages) so that results reflect overall utility as dosely as
possible (Boudreau & Rynes, 1985).
Field surveys might also play an imponant role in bringing more of an organizational
orientation to attraction research. For example, in large organizations, survey designs could be
used to model attraction as a function of business unit recruitment practices and expenditures,
relative wage and benefit levels, market conditions, and so on (e.g., see Hanssens & Levien,
1983). In this way, the cost-benefit relationships associated with various attraction practices
might be determined, controlling for variations in market conditions. Similar studies could also
be designed across organizations within a given industry.
There is also a call for basic descriptive work on how attraction strategies actually emerge
in organizations. For example, little research exists concerning the following aspects of the
present model: (1) what conditions (and at what level of severity) trigger searches for new
attraction strategies; (2) the extent to which attraction strategies are hierarchically ordered (e.g..
recruitment first, targeted pools second, inducements third), versus contingency-based, (3)
whether changes in cenain attraction strategies (e.g., applicant targets) invariably invoke
consideration of Other strategies (e.g., inducement levels), and (4) who are the major players in
the decision making process under varying conditions (e.g., under what conditions does input
from line management increase or decrease?). Insights into such questions might be gained by
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studying differences in attraction strategies between low-paying versus high-paying organizations,
organizations in growth versus decline stages, or within-organization differences in attraction
strategies for high- versus low-demand occupations.
Applicant-Oriented Research. With a few modifications, results from applicant-oriented
research could also be made more relevant to organizations. One such modification would be to
ensure that futUre studies of recruitment practices include information about pre-hire as well as
post-hire outcomes, and dropouts as well as acceptees (see also Boudreau & Rynes, 1985).
Until the effects of employer selection, employee self-selection, and post-hire events are are
disentangled in recruitment research, no conclusions can be drawn about the overall utility of
various recruitment strategies, or of the dynamics involved in producing observed post-hire
effects. Thus, longitudinal research combining pre- and post-hire outcomes (both qualitative and
quantitative) would be extremely valuable.
A second contribution would be to study applicant decisions at more phases of the
organizational choice process. As noted earlier, virtually all recruitment research has been
conducted at the campus interview stage, when a variety of applicant self-selection (and
organizational selection) decisions have already been made.
In addition to examining different phases of the process, attention should be paid to
selecting the appropriate dependent variable(s) for each phase. For example, most studies of the
campus interview use willingness to accept the job as a dependent variable (e.g., Harris & Fink.
1987; Rynes & Miller, 1983). In fact, however, the primary decision at this stage is whether or
not to continue in the recruitment process (e.g., whether to accept a site visit). In contrast, job
acceptance decisions are typical1y made only after acquiring considerably more infonnation. bOth
about the job of interest and about competing alternatives.
Third, applicant-oriented research has been conducted almost exclusively where applicants
are plentiful and easily accessible to researchers; i.e., on college campuses. This practice has
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resulted in serious restriction of range in terms of the types of job seekers, vacancies, and labor
markets studied (Rynes, et aI., 1980; Wanous & Colella, in press). For example, we know very
little about how job seekers behave in markets without centralized intermediaries (e.g., the
college placement office), or how currently-employed individuals find new jobs (Schwab, et al.,
1987). Homogeneous sampling has also inhibited our ability to detect potential interactions
between applicant characteristics and various attraction practices.
Founh, previous applicant-oriented research has been based almost exclusively on applicant
perceptions. As such, we rarely have information about "true" levels of studied variables (e.g.,
recruiter competence, employment inducements) or the accuracy of applicants' perceptions (see
Wanous, 1977). Given the documented uncenainty surrounding most job choice decisions (e.g..
Reynolds, 1951; Schwab et aI., 1987), common method variance and a variety of cognitive and
perceptual biases represent serious threats to the internal validity of such research (e.g., Janis &
Mann, 1977; Schwab et aI., 1987; Soelberg, 1967). In shon, there is a need to supplement
applicant perceptual data in future research, either with objective data or with perceptual data
from other sources.
Finally. the tendency to study only one (or at most two) attraction-related strategies at a
time has probably contributed to serious omitted variable bias in terms of what we think we
know about attraction (James, Mulaik & Brett, 1982). For example, most prior research
suggests that observed recruiter effect sizes are smaller when employment inducements are taken
intO account than when they are not (e.g., Powell, 1984; Rynes & Miller, 1983: Taylor &
Bergmann, 1987). This suggests that even when researchers are interested primarily in one
attraction strategy (e.g., recruitment timing), they should be careful to document other potentially
relevant variables (e.g., level of inducements, occupational and geographical labor market
conditions). At the very least, such practices would contribute to a more efficient search for
possible moderators via future meta-analyses.
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Applicant/Organization Interactions. Research is also needed that explicitly examines
interactions between applicants' and organizations' behaviors and decisions. Two key issues
involve (1) the extent to which organizations and applicants "son" themselves into hierarchies
(and, if so, on what dimensions), and (2) how information is communicated from one party to
the other.
If (as economists and sociologists argue) general hierarchies of job and applicant
attractiveness exist, at least two additional questions are raised. One is whether, or under what
conditions, applicants or organizations self-select out of the attraction process because of beliefs
that they are in a "lower tier" than the opposing party. For example, second tier employers
may attempt to attract students from top tier universities, rationalizing that (1) some students
will be successfully attracted because of lower relative marketability or poor information about
alternatives, and (2) even if such attempts fail, they can always recruit later at lower-ranked
schools (Thurow, 1975). On the other hand, these organizations may choose to avoid top tier
sources if costs of recruiting exceed benefits (e.g., if acceptance rates are extremely low, or if
only the least desirable candidates can be attracted).
On the applicant side, expectancy theory and some efficiency wage theorists argue that
applicants self-select out of the application process when confronted with "good" vacancies
which they feel underqualified to fill (Schwab, et aI., 1987; Weiss, 1980). However, others
suggest that applicants, like employers, aim as high as they can, hoping top-tier employers will
(perhaps mistakenly) accept them (e.g., Thurow, 1975). Still others suggest that there may be
considerable individual differences in self-selection strategies (e.g., Rynes & Lawler, 1983).
A second soning question concerns whether or not the timing of organizational and
applicant search activities are correlated with one's position in the hierarchy. As mentioned
earlier, it has been speculated but not demonstrated that the most desirable employers and
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applicants match up early, with lower-tier matches occurring in subsequent periods (e.g.,
Schwab, et aI., 1987; Thurow, 1975).
With regard to pre-hire communications between applicants and organizations, at least two
questions merit future attention. One concerns the signalling that occurs between applicants and
organizations in the absence of perfect information (e.g., Rynes & Miller, 1983; Spence, 1973).
Given imperfect information, interesting questions exist about the inferences drawn from
observable characteristics (organization's product, applicant's GPA) to imponant "unknowns"
(e.g., organizational growth potential, applicant motivation).
Informational uncenainties also raise questions about manipulating the order of information
presentation, as well as the techniques used to inform the opposing pany about unverifiable
attributes (e.g., applicant motivation, organizational career prospects). Because such issues are
generally subject to substantial organizational and applicant control, they would appear to be
fruitful areas for future research.
Conclusion
Prior research on attraction is dispersed across a variety of literatures, each of which has
developed its own unique perspective of the attraction process. For example, industrial
psychologists have focused on recruitment practices and applicant attitudes; economists on
employment inducements and applicant behaviors, and sociologists on social aspects of job
search and early socialization.
An integration of these perspectives is panicularly desirable in light of widespread
anticipated labor shonages (Johnston, 1987). These shonages will force more and more
organizations to shift from "scripted" attraction behaviors to conscious strategic deliberation.
The present paper provides a tentative framework for organizational decision makers confronted
with attraction chaHenges, as well as for researchers who wish to increase our understanding of
the entire attraction process.
30
References
Arrow, K. J. (1972) Models of discrimination. In A. H. Pascal Ed.), Racial Discrimination in
Economic Life. Lexington, MA.: Lexington Books.
Arvey, R., Gordon, M., Massengill, D., & Mussio, S. (1975). Differential dropout rates of
minority and majority job candidates due to time lags between selection procedures.
Personnel Psychology, 38, 175-180.
Bernstein, A. (1987) Dispelling the myths about a higher minimum wage. Business Week,
Oct. 19, p. 146.
Boudreau, 1. W., & Rynes, S. L. (1985) Role of recruitment in staffmg utility analysis.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 70, 354-366.
Breaugh, 1. A. (1981) Relationships between recruiting sources and employee performance,
absenteeism, and work attitudes. Academy of Management Journal, 24, 142, 147-148.
Doeringer, P.B. and Piore, M. (1971) Internal labor markets and manpower analysis.
Lexington, MA.: Lexington Books, Inc.
Finney, M.I. (1989). The ASPA labor shonage survey. Personnel Administrator. 34, #2, 35-42.
Fishbein, M. & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief. attitude. intention and behavior: An introduction to
theory and research. Reading, MA.: Addison-Wesley.
Fisher, CD. (1986). Organizational socialization: An integrative review. In K.M. Rowland
and G.R. Ferris (Eds.), Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management, Vol.
4, 101-146. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Fisher, CD., IIgen, D.R. & Hoyer, W.D. (1979). Source credibility, information favorability.
and job offer acceptance. Academy of Management Journal. 22. 94-103.
Goldthorpe, 1.H., Lockwood, D., Bechhofer, F., and Platt, J. (1969). The affluent worker in the
class structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gordon, D.M., Edwards, R. & Reich, M. (1982). Segmented work, divided workers: The
31
historical tranformation of labor in the United States. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Granovener, M.S. (1974) Gening a job: A study of contacts and careers. Cambridge, MA.:
Harvard University Press.
Granovetter, M.S. (1986) Labor mobility, internal markets, and job matching: A comparison of
the sociological and economicapproaches. In R.V. Robinson (Ed.), Research in Social
Stratification and Mobility, Vol. 5, 3-39.
Guion, R. M. (1976) Recruiting, selection, and job placement. In M.D. Dunnette (Ed.),
Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology, 777-828. Chicago, Rand-McNally.
Hanigan, M. (1987) Campus recruiters upgrade their pitch. Personnel Administrator, 32, 55-58.
Hanssens, D. M., & Levien, H. A. (1983) An econometric study of recruitment marketing in
the U. S. Navy. Management Science, 29, 1167-1184.
Harris, M. M., & Fink, L. S. (1987) A field study of employment opportunities: Does the
recruiter make a difference? Personnel Psychology, 40, 765-784.
James, L. R., Mulaik, S. A., & Brett, 1. M. (1982) Causal analysis: Assumptions. models. and
data. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
Janis, I.L. & Mann, L. (1977) Decision making: A psychological analysis of conflict. choice
and commitment. New York: The Free Press.
Johnston, W. B. (1987) Workforce 2000: Work and workers for the 21st century. Indianapolis:
Hudson Institute.
Jurgensen, C. E. (1978) Job preferences (What makes a job good or bad?) Journal of Applied
Psychology, 63, 267-276.
Kanter, R.M. (1977) Men and women of the corporation. New York: Basic Books.
Kerr, c., & Fisher, L.H. (1950) Effect of environment and administration on job evaluation.
Harvard Business Review, 77-96.
32
Kilduff, M. J. (1988) Decision making in context: Social and personality cOITelatesof choices
of organizations. Ithaca, NY.: Unpublished doctoral dissenation, Cornell University.
Klein, H.J. (1989) An integrated control theory model of work motivation. Academy of
Management Review, 14, 150-172.
Kolenko, T.A. & Taylor, M.S. (1984) Organizational image: Dimensionality and relationships
to job search attitudes and behaviors. Working paper, University of Wisconsin.
Krett, K., & Stright, J. F. (1985) Using market research as a recruitment strategy. Personnel,
62, 32-36.
Lakhani, H. (1988) The effect of pay and retention bonuses on quit rates in the U. S. Anny.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 41, 430-438.
Lawler, E.E. Ill. (1971) Pay and organizational effectiveness: A psychological view. New
York: McGraw-HilI.
Lawler, E.E. III (1986). High involvement management. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Lewin, T. (1987). Law fIrms add second tier. New York Times, March 11, 1987.
MaIm, F. T. (1955) Hiring procedures and selection standards in the San Francisco Bay area.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 8, 231-252.
Merrill, P. (1987) Sign of the times. Personnel Administrator, 32, 62-65.
Olian, J.D. & Blackburn, R.S. (1983) An information processing approach to perceptions of
organizations within the job search framework. Working paper, University of Maryland.
Osterman, P. (1987) Choice of employment systems in internal labor markets. Industrial
Relations, 26, 46-67.
Powell, G. N. (1984) Effects of job attributes and recruiting practices on applicant decisions:
A comparison. Personnel Psychology, 37, 721-732.
Premack, S. L., & Wanous, J. P. (1985) A meta-analysis of realistic job preview experiments.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 70, 706-719.
33
Reynolds, L. G. (1951) The structure of labor markets. New York: Harper & Bros.
Rottenberg, S. (1956) On choice in labor markets. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 9,
183-199.
Rynes, S. L. (In press). Recruitment, job choice, and post-hire consequences: A call for new
research directions. In M. D.Dunnette (Ed.), Handbook of Industrial and Organizational
Psychology, 2nd ed. Palo Alto: Consulting Psychologists' Press, Inc.
Rynes, S. L., & Boudreau, J. W. (1986) College recruiting in large organizations: Practice,
evaluation, and research implications. Personnel Psychology, 39, 729-758.
Rynes, S. L., Heneman, H. G. III, & Schwab, D. P. (1980) Individual reactions to
organizational recruiting: A review. Personnel Psychology, 33, 529-542.
Rynes, S. L. & Lawler, 1. (1983) A policy-capturing investigation of the role of expectancies
in decisions to pursue job alternatives. Journal of Applied Psychology, 68, 620-631.
Rynes, S. L., & Miller, H. E. (1983) Recruiter and job influences on candidates for
employment. Journal of Applied Psychology, 68, 147-154.
Rynes, S. L., Schwab, D. P., & Heneman, H. G. III (1983) The role of pay and market pay
variability in job application decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human
Performance, 31, 353-364.
Schneider, B. (1976) Staffing organizations. Santa Monica: Goodyear.
Schneider, B. (1987) The people make the place. Personnel Psychology, 40, 437-454.
Schwab, D. P. (1982) Recruiting and organizational participation. In K. Rowland and G. Ferris
Eds.), Personnel management. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 103-128.
Schwab, D. P., Rynes, S. L., & Aldag, R. J. (1987) Theories and research on job search and
choice. In K. Rowland & G. Ferris (Eds.), Research in personnel and human resource
management, Vol. 5, 129-166. Greenwich: JAI Press.
Smith, A. (1963) The wealth of nations (vol. 1). Homewood, II.: Irwin.
34
Soelberg, P. O. (1967) Unprogrammed decision making. Industrial Management Review, 8,
19-29.
Spence, M. (1973) Job market signalling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, 355-374.
Stoops, R. (1984) Reader survey suppons marketing approach to recruitment. Personnel
Journal, 63, 22-24.
Sutton, R.I. & Louis, M.R. (1987) How selecting and socializing newcomers influences
insiders. Human Resource Management, 26, 347-361.
Tannen, M. B. (1987) Is the Army college fund meeting its objectives? Industrial and Labor
Relations Review, 41, 50-62.
Taylor, M. S., & Bergmann, T. J. (1987) Organizational recruitment activities and applicants'
reactions at different stages of the recruitment process. Personnel Psychology, 40,
261-285.
Taylor, M.S., & Schmidt, D.W. (1983) A process-oriented investigation of recruitment source
effectiveness. Personnel Psychology, 36, 343-354.
Thurow, L. (1975) Generating inequality. New York: Basic Books.
Ullman, J. C. (1966) Employee referrals: Prime tool for recruiting workers. Personnel, 43,
30-35.
Wanous, J. P. (1977) Organizational entry: Newcomers moving from outside to inside.
Psychological Bulletin, 84(4), 601-618.
Wanous, J. P. (1980) Organizational entry: Recruitment. selection. and socialization of
newcomers. Reading, Ma.: Addison-Wesley.
Wanous, 1. P., & Colella, A. (In press). Organizational entry research: Current status and future
directions. Fonhcoming in K. Rowland & G. Ferris (Eds.), Research in Personnel and
Human Resources Management, Vol. 8.
Weiss, A. (1980) Job queues and layoffs in labor markets with flexible wages. Journal of
Political Economy, 88, 526-538.
Yellen, J.L. (1984) Efficiency wage models of unemployment, American Economic Review,
74, 200-205.
35
36
Footnotes
1. Assessments of job attractiveness are admittedly subject to individual differences in tastes
and preferences (e.g., Smith, 1963), as well as to characteristics of occupational labor markets
(e.g., Rynes, et aI., 1983). However, there appear to be some job characteristics that are
generally preferred by most applicants (e.g., high pay and security, low physical risk;
Rottenberg, 1956), and some organizations that are generally preferred over others (e.g., Kolenko
& Taylor, 1984; Olian & Blackburn, 1982). Moreover, efficiency wage and segmented market
theories explicitly assume that hierarchies of both job, and applicant, "goodness" exist and are
generally identifiable. As such, vacancy attractiveness appears to be at least roughly
determinable (although rarely investigated empirically).
Similar arguments apply to general assessments of applicant quality (e.g., Arrow, 1972;
Spence, 1973; Thurow, 1975).
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